



BACKGROUND GUIDE

CHANGE THE WORLD

EMIRATES 2025

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL

CHANGE
— THE —
WORLD
ACADEMY

POWERED
BY



Diplomatici

Distinguished Delegates,

Welcome to the 2025 Change the World Model United Nations (CWMUN).

As your committee Dais, we are looking forward to meeting you and to hear your ideas about how to solve international problems.

The United Nations (UN) depends on the cooperation and goodwill of its 193 Member States. Because each State has unique interests and concerns, it is challenging to write, negotiate and pass resolutions. Every stage of the process demands creativity and diplomacy.

You will be discussing this topic:

The situation in Libya

While we may all lead different lives and face different struggles, we have to bear in mind that we all share the same world and the same resources. Whether it is environmental problems or political unrest, what is happening in the world concerns all of us. Only through mutual understanding, unity, and collaboration can we lay the foundations of a worthier world.

As your committee Dais, we will work to keep the committees running smoothly. We will do our best to help you understand the procedures and to ensure that the perspectives of all delegates are heard and respected.

Sincerely,

The CWMUN



What is this activity about?

The Change the World Model United Nations is a role-playing game. Your task is to impersonate a diplomat of the assigned Country and present the perspective of this Country's current government.

What should you do now?

Before the Simulation, you should write down and bring with you:

- **Handbook**, a collection of relevant UN resolutions, reports, academic studies, and news from reliable media.
- Write the **Position Paper**, describing the position of your country on the topic you have been assigned to.
- Some topics for **Moderated Caucus debates**, i.e. for short formal debates which should cover narrow aspects of each topic. *For example*, within the topic "Violence against women"; delegates can hold a caucus with the subtopic "Ways of preventing genital mutilation".
- **Ideas for the Resolution**, *id est*, at least two or three paragraphs that your State would like to include in the preamble and/or in the main body of the Resolution.
- You should also learn the **Rules of procedure**.

What will you do during the Simulation?

In the Moderated Caucus you will hold short formal debates on details of each topic. Delegates will present the policy and solutions of the represented States in very short (usually one minute) speeches. In the Unmoderated Caucus, you will informally engage with other Delegates to agree on your policies and solutions and to write draft resolutions together as a Coalition. Working Papers will be checked and possibly edited by Chair and Director to conform to all formal requirements and be described as Draft Resolutions. Eventually, Coalitions will present their Draft Resolutions to the whole Committee. Other Delegates will debate and then vote for or against. The scope for the Committee as a whole is to produce one or more Resolutions.

What is a Resolution?

A Resolution is a very specific document, built of Preambulatory and Operative clauses, expressing the will of a particular UN Committee agreed upon by its Member States. Resolutions are central to the UN and thus CWMUN gives all participants the opportunity to understand the process of creating them. Please seize this opportunity and prepare in advance at least one or two paragraphs per each topic! Sample resolution: [Resolution 2349 \(2017\)](#)¹

Tips (!)

Learn about your Country from the [CIA World Factbook](#)², from the official website of your State's permanent mission to the United Nations, and from other government websites (for example the website and social media profiles of the Royal Family or President, Prime Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs...). Make sure to know as much as possible about the foreign relations of your Country! Consider that at the United Nations, Countries generally lean towards their own geopolitical blocks: Western, Former Soviet, African, Middle Eastern, Asian, Latin American... Consider also organisations such as the European Union (EU), African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), The Union of South American Nations (USAN)...

¹ UN General Assembly, 2017 ([https://undocs.org/S/RES/2349\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/2349(2017)))

² CIA, 2022 (<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/>)

REMEMBER!

Your task is to present the official position of your assigned Country. Misrepresenting this position and/or representing your private views is against the rules, even if you do not agree with your Country's position. In any case, you must not hyperbolize nor satirise the position of your Country. Humour, and especially sarcasm, is generally not typical for formal writing nor formal debates. Although MUN welcomes wit and smart puns, please always be extremely considerate when using humour.

SECURITY COUNCIL

1. *Establishment of the Security Council*

On January 1, 1942, United States' President Roosevelt, United Kingdom Prime Minister Churchill, Maxim Litvinov of the USSR, and T. V. Soong of the Republic of China signed a brief document, later known as the United Nations Declaration³. In the following years, 26 other States ratified the Declaration, and by March 1st, 1945, 21 additional states had signed. At this point, the "Big Four", namely the four main Allied nations (the US, the UK, the USSR, and the Republic of China) who had envisaged the organisation first in 1942, became the foundation of the Security Council.

In mid-1944, the “Big Four” met for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference⁴ to negotiate the structure of the United Nations. There it was established that France, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America would be the permanent members of the Security Council (also known as the “Big Five”, the “Permanent Five” or “P5”).

The Charter of the United Nations⁵ was signed on 26 June 1945, at the end of the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, founding the United Nations. The Charter established the main bodies of the United Nations, among which is the Security Council⁶.

Later on, at the Yalta Conference in 1945, the American, British, and Russian delegations agreed that the permanent members of the Security Council could veto any council action, but the procedural resolutions.

The Security Council met for the first time on 17 January 1946 at Church House, Westminster, in London, United Kingdom, and adopted provisional rules of

³ <http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420101a.html>

⁴ Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia (2022, August 14). Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Dumbarton-Oaks-Conference>

⁵ The Charter of the United Nations, October 24, 1945.

⁶ Main Bodies. (n.d.). United Nations . <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/main-bodies>

procedure. Since its first meeting, the Security Council has taken permanent residence at the United Nations Headquarters in New York⁷.

Each member of the Security Council has one vote and the Permanent Members are endowed with veto power.

2. Functions and objectives of the Security Council:

The functions and objectives of the Security Council (SC) are established in Chapters V, VII, and XII of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Security Council of the United Nations is the body primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security, according to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. All UN member states have agreed to accept and carry out the council's decisions by the Charter.

When evaluating whether there is aggression or threat to the peace, the Security Council is in charge. It has the option of using sanctions or even approving the use of force to preserve or restore global peace and security⁸.

The Security Council investigates disputes or situations which might lead to international tensions, to determine the existence of any threat to peace and recommend what actions should be taken. It suggests methods of adjusting the terms of the settlement and recommends parties to a conflict to settle it peacefully. One of its functions is recommending methods of adjusting such disputes or terms of the settlement.

To promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council formulates plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations to establish a system for the regulation of armaments⁹.

The Security Council is empowered to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to stop aggression. Or else, it is empowered to take military action against an aggressor¹⁰.

⁷Security Council. (n.d.). United Nations . <https://www.un.org/en/model-United-nations/security-council>

⁸ United Nations Charter, Chapter V: The Security Council. (n.d.). <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-5>

⁹ See 6

¹⁰ United Nations Charter, Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. (n.d.). <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7>

Moreover, one of the functions of the Security Council is to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of new Members, the appointment of the Secretary-General, and, together with the Assembly, elect judges of the International Court of Justice.

Lastly, the Security Council exercises trusteeship functions of the United Nations in “strategic areas”, namely the performance of administrative and supervisory functions to maintain peace and security in such areas¹¹.

3. Important actions or projects in the past:

The Security Council has been particularly active after the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, mainly because of the lack of constant vetoes from the USSR or the US, as it previously had happened. Things changed, with the Cooperation between East and West becoming a reality. During the Gulf War of 1990, the Security Council started to get together and meet continuously until today (in many different situations and with many contrasting positions among the permanent members)¹². Before the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the Council had used sanctions only twice: in 1966, enacting a trade embargo against Zimbabwe (former Southern Rhodesia)¹³, and in 1977 an arms embargo was imposed against South Africa during the apartheid regime¹⁴. In the 1990s, starting with Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council began to make recurrent use of sanctions. As of 2022, there are fourteen Security Council sanctions regimes in force including more than six hundred individuals and almost three hundred companies.

The Security Council in its history has established sixty-two Peacekeeping operations and three advance or observer missions¹⁵. Peacekeeping is the UN's largest and most expensive endeavours, which can be divisive, particularly when "strong" operations involve the use of lethal force. Peacekeeping operations are

¹¹ United Nations Charter, Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System. (n.d.), from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-12>

¹² Secretary General reviews lessons learned during “sanctions decade” in remarks to international peace academy seminar| UN Press. (n.d.), from <https://press.un.org/en/2000/20000417.sgsm7360.doc.html>

¹³ UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 232 (1966) [Southern Rhodesia], 16 December 1966, S/RES/232 (1966), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f23414.html>

¹⁴ UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 418 (1977) [South Africa], 4 November 1977, S/RES/418 (1977), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f16e30.html>

¹⁵ Peacekeeping Operations. (n.d.), from <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/peacekeeping-missions#reg35>

overall aimed at “*assisting conflicting parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building, and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development, and rehabilitation of the country*”¹⁶.

Among such operations, it is worth mentioning the Iraq-Kuwait conflict in 1990, gathering all the SC means and modus operandi. It was a turning point, marking the beginning of the Security Council activism, not only on Peacekeeping missions but also in the use of sanctioning power. In dealing with the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the SC has taken decisions under Chapter VII of the UN charter. Under this chapter, conceived as a key element of the UN system of collective security, the Security Council “*shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security*”. Such measures could include partial or complete interruption of economic relations and means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations. Should those measures prove inadequate, the council can take “*such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to restore international peace and security*”. The Security Council had adopted sixteen resolutions by 2002, and then Resolution 1441 was adopted, giving an ultimatum for disarmament to Saddam Hussein¹⁷.

The Council has authorized the use of force in two other prior situations, although chapter VII of the Charter was not explicitly invoked in the enabling Resolutions. In 1950, as the Korean War began, the Security Council, with the USSR absent, recommended to all Member States to provide military forces and other assistance, placing them under a unified command under the US. Secondly, in the case of Congo in 1961, the SC, under exceptional circumstances, authorized the UN peacekeeping operation known as Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war in that country¹⁸.

The activism of the Security Council has also enlarged recognition of unprotected categories. SC Resolution 1325¹⁹ (2000) was the first landmark resolution on women, peace, and security. It addresses the effects of war on women and the

¹⁶UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1118 (1997) [Angola], 30 June 1997, S/RES/1118 (1997), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f16f4.html>

¹⁷ <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/478123>

¹⁸ UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 161 (1961) [The Congo Question], 21 February 1961, S/RES/161 (1961), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f2bc1c.html>

¹⁹ UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and security], 31 October 2000, S/RES/1325 (2000), available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f4672e.html>

significance of women's full and equal participation in post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping efforts. The resolution also deals with the UN's gender-related obligations in many political and programmatic spheres and demands special steps to safeguard women and girls from sexual abuse associated with conflicts²⁰.

4. *Challenges and important future projects:*

The international scenario has profoundly changed since the United Nations' establishment in 1945. However, the Security Council still reflects the balance of power which emerged at the end of the Second World War. In 1945, the UN had 51 members. The only reform in the composition took place in 1963, following the increase in the number of members to 117, and the non-permanent Members going from 6 to 10. In 1971, the People's Republic of China took the permanent seat previously held by the Republic of China (*now* Taiwan). Then, the Russian Federation replaced the USSR in 1991. Since then, the body's composition has remained unchanged. The United Nations now has 193 Member States, making the Council's existing seat distribution both numerically and geographically unbalanced to ensure adequate representation of the whole UN membership. Following the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the need to reform the Security Council was even clearer, with non-aligned nations leading the charge. The two main areas that need to be changed are the expansion of the membership and new working methods for better relationships between the members, especially concerning veto power.

The chances of significant reforms are viewed as remote since modifying the UN Charter requires a majority vote and domestic ratification by two-thirds of UN member states. This includes all of the permanent members of the Security Council endowed with veto power, who are unlikely to take actions to limit their authority. Although there is consensus among UN members that the Security Council's composition needs to be updated, each of the many reform ideas unavoidably leaves some aspirants dissatisfied²¹.

Regional powers including Brazil, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, and South Africa have aimed to increase the size of the Council or win permanent seats for themselves. Following Brexit, some have demanded that France give up its permanent seat to the European Union, particularly when France and Germany opted to split the Council's two-month presidency in 2019.

Some initiatives call for more permanent members, while others propose a new class of elected seats with the possibility of re-election. Smaller states have pushed for

²⁰ Landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security. (n.d.), from <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/>

²¹ <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto>

procedural improvements, such as increased transparency and closer engagement with nations that provide troops, in the absence of charter amendments.

However, the questions have persisted over the years and continue to do so now, without coming to a resolution.

The situation in Libya

1. Introduction: A Nation Divided

More than a decade after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains locked in a state of institutional disintegration and violent fragmentation. Instead of transitioning toward democratic governance, the country has split between two rival centers of power: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, recognized by the United Nations, and the House of Representatives in Tobruk, backed militarily by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA)^{22 23}. Both sides claim legitimacy, but the absence of a unified electoral framework has allowed the deadlock to persist.

At least seven foreign powers now operate in Libya either directly or via proxy militias—namely Turkey, Russia, the UAE, Egypt, France, Italy, and Sudanese forces²⁴. These actors are driven by diverse agendas: energy access, military positioning, control over migration flows, and regional rivalry.

The struggle for control over natural resources—especially oil—further complicates the crisis. Libya produces over 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, but its revenue streams are often diverted by local actors through smuggling, blockades, or external shipping deals that violate UN sanctions^{25 26}. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) frequently declares force majeure due to militia activity or political pressure.

Libya’s geopolitical importance is also underscored by its role as a key transit hub for migrants heading toward Europe. The EU’s \$455 million border management strategy in Libya has come under intense scrutiny for indirectly supporting coast

²² BBC News. (2024, January 15). *Libya’s political divide: Why elections keep failing*. <https://www.bbc.com>

²³ United Nations Security Council. (2024). *Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL (S/2024/312)*. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil>

²⁴ International Crisis Group. (2024, March 28). *Libya’s enduring conflict: The foreign factor* (Middle East Report No. 210). <https://www.crisisgroup.org>

²⁵ International Monetary Fund. (2024). *Libya: 2024 Article IV consultation*. <https://www.imf.org>

²⁶ National Oil Corporation Libya. (2024). *Force majeure declaration*. <https://noc.ly>

guard units and detention centers involved in systemic human rights abuses^{27 28 29}. Amnesty International and UN reports have documented cases of torture, extortion, and migrant disappearances linked to EU-funded programs^{30 31}.

Diplomatically, efforts to resolve Libya’s political crisis have repeatedly failed. Since 2021, elections have been postponed six times, reflecting the absence of consensus on key legal and constitutional frameworks^{32 33}. Attempts to broker peace—through platforms like the Berlin Process and UNSMIL (United Nations Support Mission in Libya)—have had limited impact due to lack of enforcement authority and uneven international buy-in^{34 35}. As a result, Libya has become a proxy battlefield where foreign-backed military forces, disinformation campaigns, and geoeconomic interests intersect to undermine sovereignty and stability.

2. The Military Standoff

2.1 Current Conflict Dynamics

Libya’s battlefield is split down the middle by an imaginary geographical line situated in proximity of the city of Sirte, which marks both a geographical and ideological divide. On the west side of the city, the Tripoli-based GNU is backed militarily by Turkey, which deploys Bayraktar TB2 drones and fields 3,500 Syrian mercenaries operating out of Misrata^{36 37}. On the other hand, Haftar’s LNA holds the east with military aid from Russia, the UAE, and Egypt.

The Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary force, has constructed fortified bases at Jufra airbase and received Grad rocket systems via Egyptian channels in violation

²⁷ UNHCR. (2024). *Central Mediterranean route update*. <https://www.unhcr.org>

²⁸ Amnesty International. (2024). *EU complicity in Libyan abuses*. <https://www.amnesty.org>

²⁹ German Foreign Office. (2024, July). *Berlin Process review briefing*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>

³⁰ International Peace Institute. (2024). *UNSMIL under strain*. <https://www.ipinst.org>

³¹ African Union Peace and Security Council. (2024). *Regional mediation in North Africa*. <https://www.peaceau.org>

³² UNSMIL. (2024, February 12). *Statement on election postponement*. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org>

³³ Amnesty International. (2024). *Libya detention updates*. <https://www.amnesty.org>

³⁴ German Federal Foreign Office. (2024). *Berlin Process minutes*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>

³⁵ Zhdanov, I. (2024). *Paramilitary realignment in Libya*. *Russian Journal of Strategic Affairs*, 12(2), 44–57.

³⁶ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. (2024, May 8). *Mercenary deployment tracker*. <https://www.syriaohr.com>

³⁷ Janes Defense Weekly. (2024, June 11). *Turkish drone operations in North Africa*. <https://www.janes.com>

of UN embargoes^{38 39}. In 2019, Turkey signed a maritime Memorandum of Understanding with the GNU, fueling regional maritime tensions and Turkish strategic claims⁴⁰.

2.2 The GRU and Wagner's Consolidation

In 2023, Russia formally transferred Wagner's Libya operations under the command of its military intelligence agency, the GRU⁴¹ (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye). This transition marks a turning point from semi-deniable operations to open institutional presence. The GRU now directs tactical operations with strategic goals including access to energy sites, anti-NATO maneuvering, and support for local militias^{42 43}.

Satellite imagery shows expanded supply corridors linking Jufra to oil installations in southern Libya, while digital disinformation campaigns trace back to Russian-aligned proxies in Tripoli and Misrata^{44 45}. Italy, concerned about growing Russian influence, has increased naval surveillance near its energy interests off the Libyan coast⁴⁶.

3. Economic Warfare

3.1 Oil as a Weapon

Control over oil resources remains Libya's most contested prize. In 2023, Haftar's month-long blockade of Ras Lanuf caused an estimated \$6 billion in losses⁴⁷. Meanwhile, Russian tankers have been spotted conducting nighttime oil transfers using cloaked satellite signatures—echoing tactics employed in Syria and

³⁸Maxar Technologies. (2024, May 22). *Satellite images: Wagner infrastructure at Jufra*. <https://www.maxar.com>

³⁹ Conflict Armament Research. (2024). *Egyptian arms transfers to Libya*. <https://www.conflictarm.com>

⁴⁰ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024). *Turkey-Libya maritime agreement*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr>

⁴¹ Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). (2024). *Wagner's transition to GRU control*. <https://rusi.org>

⁴² Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). (2024). *From shadow force to state actor: Wagner's absorption into the GRU*. <https://rusi.org>

⁴³ Zhdanov, I. (2024). *Paramilitary realignment in Libya and beyond*. *Russian Journal of Strategic Affairs*, 12(2), 44–57.

⁴⁴ Maxar Technologies. (2024, May). *Satellite analysis: GRU supply routes in Jufra*. <https://www.maxar.com>

⁴⁵ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2024). *Russia's asymmetric warfare footprint in Africa*. <https://www.iiss.org>

⁴⁶ Aliseo (2024, September 22) *Perché la sicurezza e il successo dell'Italia passano per il Mediterraneo* <https://aliseoeditoriale.it/perche-la-sicurezza-e-il-successo-dellitalia-passano-per-il-mediterraneo/>

⁴⁷ National Oil Corporation Libya. (2024). *Force majeure declaration*. <https://noc.ly>

Venezuela⁴⁸. About 15% of national production is siphoned through smuggling networks connected to Malta and other Mediterranean hubs⁴⁹.

These informal economies empower militias and erode the authority of Libya's official institutions. The National Oil Corporation is often held hostage by rival factions for political gain or control over payroll and contracts.

3.2 Migration Crisis and EU Complicity

The EU's (European Union's) border outsourcing model has been widely criticized. While intended to curb migrant crossings, its implementation through Libyan actors has facilitated large-scale abuse. EU-trained coast guard units have reportedly sold migrants to detention centers run by militias, where they face extortion, forced labor, and torture^{50 51 52 53}. In 2023, over 600 intercepted migrants vanished after being returned to Libya using EU-provided vessels⁵⁴.

The International Organization for Migration reported over 2,500 migrant deaths in the Central Mediterranean that year—many tied to EU-funded pushbacks or failed rescues⁵⁵. These policies raise serious legal questions under international humanitarian law, particularly concerning the principle of non-refoulement.

4. Initiatives, projects and actions made by the SC

UN and International Diplomatic Interventions

4.1 UNSMIL: Symbolism Over Substance

⁴⁸ TankerTrackers.com. (2024). *Nighttime oil transfers dataset*. <https://www.tankertrackers.com>

⁴⁹ Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime. (2024). *Libyan oil smuggling networks*. <https://globalinitiative.net>

⁵⁰ Forensic Oceanography. (2024). *Migrant pushback economies*. <https://www.forensic-architecture.org>

⁵¹ Amnesty International. (2024). *EU complicity in Libyan abuses*. <https://www.amnesty.org>

⁵² German Foreign Office. (2024, July). *Berlin Process review briefing*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>

⁵³ International Peace Institute. (2024). *UNSMIL under strain*. <https://www.ipinst.org>

⁵⁴ African Union Peace and Security Council. (2024). *Regional mediation in North Africa*. <https://www.peaceau.org>

⁵⁵ RUSI. (2024). *Wagner to GRU absorption*. <https://rusi.org>

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), under Security Council’s Resolution 2656, has had its mandate extended through April 2025⁵⁶ ⁵⁷. However, its role has become increasingly symbolic. Analysts highlight that frequent envoy resignations—five since 2021—have hampered continuity and institutional credibility⁵⁸.

4.2 Arms Embargo Failures

The UN’s 2011 arms embargo is routinely violated by major foreign actors. Despite extensive documentation by the Panel of Experts, no violator has faced meaningful sanctions⁵⁹ ⁶⁰. According to a 2024 internal review by the German Foreign Office, the Berlin Process has failed to deter embargo breaches or create accountability⁶¹.

4.3 Reforming the Berlin Process

Originally launched in 2020, the Berlin Process attempted to align international support for Libya’s stabilization. But the 2024 round produced no major outcome⁶². One key proposal calls for integrating African Union and Arab League actors more directly into the negotiations. This could regionalize peace efforts and offset the perception of Western dominance⁶³.

5. Future challenges and possible solutions

Libya faces a multidimensional crisis that is unlikely to be resolved through military means alone. Three urgent challenges threaten to prolong the conflict: the electoral

⁵⁶ UNSC Resolution 2656. (2024). *UNSMIL Mandate Renewal*. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil>

⁵⁷ Security Council Report. (2024). *Libya Sanctions Committee*. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org>

⁵⁸ Maxar Technologies. (2024). *GRU supply routes in Jufra*. <https://www.maxar.com>

⁵⁹ UN Panel of Experts. (2024). *Arms embargo violations*. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil>

⁶⁰ SIPRI. (2024). *Arms flow monitoring report*. <https://www.sipri.org>

⁶¹ Zhdanov, I. (2024). *Paramilitary realignment in Libya*. *Russian Journal of Strategic Affairs*, 12(2), 44–57.

⁶² German Federal Foreign Office. (2024). *Berlin Process minutes*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de>

⁶³ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2024). *Russia’s footprint in Africa*. <https://www.iiss.org>

deadlock, the intensifying proxy war, and a rapidly deteriorating economic environment.

5.1 Electoral Paralysis

Despite strong international consensus on the need for national elections, Libya's rival factions have failed to agree on candidate eligibility, constitutional parameters, and jurisdictional authority^{64 65}. The Carter Center's 2024 legal review warned that without electoral reform and clear enforcement mechanisms, any vote risks being rejected by one side, reigniting conflict⁶⁶. Previous UN-backed timelines have collapsed under political pressure, exposing the limits of international influence.

A potential solution would be a UN-administered electoral framework, temporarily removing technical control from local actors and ensuring neutrality. However, this approach faces resistance from Libyan leaders and regional powers wary of sovereignty infringement. Its feasibility is considered medium, and would require P5 backing at the Security Council.

5.2 Proxy Warfare Escalation

Libya is increasingly a battleground for competing global interests. Turkish drones, Russian GRU advisors, and Egyptian-backed militias have all entrenched foreign influence^{67 68 69}. The Atlantic Council notes a “high risk” of direct Turkish military escalation if Haftar's forces advance on Tripoli again⁷⁰. This risks sparking broader regional destabilization and undermining existing ceasefires.

A possible de-escalation strategy is the deployment of a regionally led stabilization force, with participation from the African Union (AU) and Arab League. Such a mission, properly mandated and resourced, could provide buffer zones, oversee disarmament, and monitor ceasefire lines. This solution is seen as high feasibility due to growing AU engagement and regional fatigue with the status quo⁷¹.

⁶⁴ UNSMIL. (2024, February 12). *Statement on election postponement*. <https://unsmil.unmissions.org>

⁶⁵ Amnesty International. (2024). *Libya detention updates*. <https://www.amnesty.org>

⁶⁶ Amnesty International. (2024). *Libya detention updates*. <https://www.amnesty.org>

⁶⁷ Janes Defense Weekly. (2024, June 11). *Turkish drone operations in North Africa*. <https://www.janes.com>

⁶⁸ Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). (2024). *Wagner's transition to GRU control*. <https://rusi.org>

⁶⁹ UN Panel of Experts. (2024). *Arms embargo violations*. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil>

⁷⁰ United Nations Human Rights Council. (2023). *Disappearance of intercepted migrants in Libya*. <https://www.ohchr.org>

⁷¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). (2024). *Russia's footprint in Africa*. <https://www.iiss.org>

5.3 Economic Collapse and Institutional Decay

Libya's economy is deteriorating rapidly. Inflation exceeds 30%, fuel and food prices are rising, and corruption in state institutions is endemic⁷². The bifurcation of financial institutions between east and west has paralyzed budget execution, debt management, and oil revenue redistribution. Without fiscal unification, foreign aid and investment will remain minimal.

One long-term solution would be a transparent oil revenue-sharing mechanism, monitored by neutral parties like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the National Oil Corporation (NOC). However, given the politicization of oil and institutional fragmentation, this option is currently considered low feasibility^{73 74}.

⁷² IOM. (2024). *Missing migrants in the Mediterranean*. <https://missingmigrants.iom.int>

⁷³ International Monetary Fund. (2024). *Libya: 2024 Article IV consultation*. <https://www.imf.org>

⁷⁴ IOM. (2024). *Missing migrants in the Mediterranean*. <https://missingmigrants.iom.int>

Annotated Biography

Hereafter you can find some links that we think could be helpful to deepen your knowledge on both the committee and the topic you will be discussing.

- The more inspiring and complete website when talking about the UN is their own: <https://www.un.org/>. Especially useful is their Official Document System (ODS) <https://documents.un.org/prod/ods.nsf/home.xsp>.
- The website of your committee is always a good place where to start, in the case of the SC, it is the following: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>

- **United Nations Security Council Report on UNSMIL (S/2024/312)**
<https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en>

Official UN assessment of diplomatic failures, highlighting institutional paralysis. Evaluates UNSMIL's struggles with political fragmentation, envoy resignations, and failure to enforce elections or arms embargoes.

- **International Crisis Group: Libya's Enduring Conflict (Report No. 210)**
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/>

Neutral, in-depth analysis of geopolitical drivers of the conflict. Analyzes foreign interference (Turkey, Russia, UAE, Egypt) in Libya's proxy war, including military support and economic exploitation.

- **Amnesty International: EU Complicity in Libyan Abuses**
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/>

Exposes human rights violations and legal breaches by EU migration policies. Documents torture, forced labor, and migrant disappearances tied to EU-funded Libyan coast guard and detention centers.

- **RUSI: Wagner's Transition to GRU Control** <https://www.rusi.org/>

Explains Russia's strategic consolidation in Libya's energy and conflict zones. Details Russia's integration of Wagner mercenaries into GRU command, signaling a shift to overt military interference in Libya.

- **UN Panel of Experts Report on Arms Embargo Violations**
<https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en>

Reveals the impunity of foreign actors fueling Libya's conflict. Documents violations of the UN arms embargo by Turkey, Russia, UAE, and others, with no meaningful sanctions imposed.



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